How does virtue theory change the discussion of the morality of abortion?

  

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From Virtue Theory and Abortion

– ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE

As everyone knows, the morality of abortion is commonly discussed in relation to just two considerations: first, and predominantly, the status of the fetus and whether or not it is the sort of thing that may or may not be innocuously or justifiably killed; and second, and less predominantly (when, that is, the discussion concerns the morality of abortion rather than the question of permissible legislation in a just society), women’s rights. If one thinks within this familiar framework, one may well be puzzled about what virtue theory, as such, could contribute. Some people assume the discussion will be conducted solely in terms of what the virtuous agent would or would not do … Others assume that only justice, or at most justice and charity, will be applied to the issue, generating a discussion very similar to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s.’
Now if this is the way the virtue theorist’s discussion of abortion is imagined to be, no wonder people think little of it. It seems obvious in advance that in any such discussion there must be either a great deal of extremely tendentious application of the virtue terms just, charitable, and so on or a lot of rhetorical appeal to “this is what only the virtuous agent knows.” But these are caricatures; they fail to appreciate the way in which virtue theory quite transforms the discussion of abortion by dismissing the two familiar dominating considerations as, in a way, fundamentally irrelevant. In what way or ways, I hope to make both clear and plausible.
Let us first consider women’s rights. Let me emphasize again that we are discussing the morality of abortion, not the rights and wrongs of laws prohibiting or permitting it. If we suppose that women do have a moral right to do as they choose with their own bodies, or, more particularly, to terminate their pregnancies, then it may well follow that a law forbidding abortion would be unjust. Indeed, even if they have no such right, such a law might be, as things stand at the moment, unjust, or impractical, or inhumane: on this issue I have nothing to say in this article. But, putting all questions about the justice or injustice of laws to one side, and supposing only that women have such a moral right, nothing follows from this supposition about the morality of abortion, according to virtue theory, once it is noted (quite generally, not with particular reference to abortion) that in exercising a moral right I can do something cruel, or callous, or selfish, light-minded, self-righteous, stupid, inconsiderate, disloyal, dishonest-that is, act viciously? Love and friendship do not survive their parties’ constantly insisting on their rights, nor do people live well when they think that getting what they have a right to is of preeminent importance; they harm others, and they harm themselves. So whether women have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies is irrelevant within virtue theory, for it is irrelevant to the question “In having an abortion in these circumstances, would the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?”
What about the consideration of the status of the fetus–what can virtue theory say about that? One might say that this issue is not in the province of any moral theory; it is a metaphysical question, and an extremely difficult one at that. Must virtue theory then wait upon metaphysics to come up with the answer?
At first sight it might seem so. For virtue is said to involve knowledge, and part of this knowledge consists in having the right attitude to things. “Right” here does not just mean “morally right” or
“proper” or “nice” in the modern sense; it means “accurate, true.” One cannot have the right or correct attitude to something if the attitude is based on or involves false beliefs. And this suggests that if the status of the fetus is relevant to the rightness or wrongness of abortion, its status must be known, as a truth, to the fully wise and virtuous person.
But the sort of wisdom that the fully virtuous person has is not supposed to be recondite; it does not call for fancy philosophical sophistication, and it does not depend upon, let alone wait upon, the discoveries of academic philosophers. And this entails the following, rather startling, conclusion: that the status of the fetus–that issue over which so much ink has been spilt-is, according to virtue theory, simply not relevant to the rightness or wrongness of abortion (within, that is, a secular morality).
Or rather, since that is clearly too radical a conclusion, it is in a sense relevant, but only in the sense that the familiar biological facts are relevant. By “the familiar biological facts” I mean the facts that most human societies are and have been familiar with–that, standardly (but not invariably), pregnancy occurs as the result of sexual intercourse, that it lasts about nine months, during which time the fetus grows and develops, that standardly it terminates in the birth of a living baby, and that this is how we all come to be.
It might be thought that this distinction–between the familiar biological facts and the status of the fetus–is a distinction without a difference. But this is not so. To attach relevance to the status of the fetus, in the sense in which virtue theory claims it is not relevant, is to be gripped by the conviction that we must go beyond the familiar biological facts, deriving some sort of conclusion from them, such as that the fetus has rights, or is not a person, or something similar. It is also to believe that this exhausts the relevance of the familiar biological facts, that all they are relevant to is the status of the fetus and whether or not it is the sort of thing that may or may not be killed.
These convictions, I suspect, are rooted in the desire to solve the problem of abortion by getting it to fall under some general rule such as “You ought not to kill anything with the right to life but may kill anything else.” But they have resulted in what should surely strike any nonphilosopher as a most bizarre aspect of nearly all the current philosophical literature on abortion, namely, that, far from treating abortion as a unique moral problem, markedly unlike any other, nearly everything written on the status of the fetus and its bearing on the abortion issue would be consistent with the human reproductive facts (to say nothing of family life) being totally different from what they are. Imagine that you are an alien extraterrestrial anthropologist who does not know that the human race is roughly 50 percent female and 50 percent male, or that our only (natural) form of reproduction involves heterosexual intercourse, viviparous birth, and the female’s (and only the female’s) being pregnant for nine months, or that females are capable of childbearing from late childhood to late middle age, or that childbearing is painful, dangerous, and emotionally charged–do you think you would pick up these facts from the hundreds of articles written on the status of the fetus? I am quite sure you would not. And that, I think, shows that the current philosophical literature on abortion has got badly out of touch with reality.
Now if we are using virtue theory, our first question is not
“What do the familiar biological facts show-what can be derived from them about the status of the fetus?” but “How do these facts figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and the nonvirtuous? What is the mark of having the right attitude to these facts and what manifests having the wrong attitude to them?” This immediately makes essentially relevant not only all the facts about human reproduction I mentioned above, but a whole range of facts about our emotions in relation to them as well. I mean such facts as that human parents, both male and female, tend to care passionately about their offspring, and that family relationships are among the deepest and strongest in our lives -and, significantly, among the longest-lasting.
These facts make it obvious that pregnancy is not just one among many other physical conditions; and hence that anyone who genuinely believes that an abortion is comparable to a haircut or an appendectomy is mistaken.* The fact that the premature termination of a pregnancy is, in some sense, the cutting off of a new human life, and thereby, like the procreation of a new human life, connects with all our thoughts about human life and death, parenthood, and family relationships, must make it a serious matter. To disregard this fact about it, to think of abortion as nothing but the killing of something that does not matter, or as nothing but the exercise of some right or rights one has, or as the incidental means to some desirable state of affairs, is to do something callous and light-minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous and wise person would do. It is to have the wrong attitude not only to fetuses, but more generally to human life and death, parenthood, and family relationships.
Although I say that the facts make this obvious, I know that this is one of my tendentious points. In partial support of it I note that even the most dedicated proponents of the view that deliberate abortion is just like an appendectomy or haircut rarely hold the same view of spontaneous abortion, that is, miscarriage. It is not so tendentious of me to claim that to react to people’s grief over miscarriage by saying, or even thinking,
“What a fuss about
nothing!” would be callous and light-minded, whereas to try to laugh someone out of grief over an appendectomy scar or a botched haircut would not be. It is hard to give this point due prominence within act-centered theories, for the inconsistency is an inconsistency in attitude about the seriousness of loss of life, not in beliefs about which acts are right or wrong. Moreover, an act-centered theorist may say, “Well, there is nothing wrong with thinking ‘What a fuss about nothing!’ as long as you do not say it and hurt the person who is grieving. And besides, we cannot be held responsible for our thoughts, only for the intentional actions they give rise to.” But the character traits that virtue theory emphasizes are not simply dispositions to intentional actions, but a seamless disposition to certain actions and passions, thoughts and reactions.
To say that the cutting off of a human life is always a matter of some seriousness, at any stage, is not to deny the relevance of gradual fetal development. Notwithstanding the well-worn point that clear boundary lines cannot be drawn, our emotions and attitudes regarding the fetus do change as it develops, and again when it is born, and indeed further as the baby grows. Abortion for shallow reasons in the later stages is much more shocking than abortion for the same reasons in the early stages in a way that matches the fact that deep grief over miscarriage in the later stages is more appropriate than it is over miscarriage in the earlier stages (when, that is, the grief is solely about the loss of this child, not about, as might be the case, the loss of one’s only hope of having a child or of having one’s husband’s child). Imagine (or recall) a woman who already has children; she had not intended to have more, but finds herself unexpectedly pregnant. Though contrary to her plans, the pregnancy, once established as a fact, is welcomed and then she loses the embryo almost immediately. If this were bemoaned as a tragedy, it would, I think, be a misapplication of the concept of what is tragic. But it may still properly be mourned as a loss. The grief is expressed in such terms as “I shall always wonder how she or he would have turned out” or “When I look at the others, I shall think,
‘How different their lives would have been if this other one had been part of them.” It would, I take it, be callous and light-minded to say, or think, “Well, she has already got four children; what’s the problem?”; it would be neither, nor arrogantly intrusive in the case of a close friend, to try to correct prolonged mourning by saying, “I know it’s sad, but it’s not a tragedy; rejoice in the ones you have.
The application of tragic becomes more appropriate as the fetus grows, for the mere fact that one has lived with it for longer, conscious of its existence, makes a difference. To shrug off an early abortion is understandable just because it is very hard to be fully conscious of the fetus’s existence in the early stages and hence hard to appreciate that an early abortion is the destruction of life. It is particularly hard for the young and inexperienced to appreciate this, because appreciation of it usually comes only with experience.
I do not mean “with the experience of having an abortion” (though that may be part of it) but, quite generally, “with the experience of life.” Many women who have borne children contrast their later pregnancies with their first successful one, saying that in the later ones they were conscious of a new life growing in them from very early on. And, more generally, as one reaches the age at which the next generation is coming up close behind one, the counterfactuals “If I, or she, had had an abortion, Alice, or Bob, would not have been born” acquire a significant application, which casts a new light on the conditionals “If I or Alice have an abortion then some Canoline or Bill will not be born.”
The fact that pregnancy is not just one among many physical conditions does not mean that one can never regard it in that light without manifesting a vice. When women are in very poor physical health, or worn out from childbearing, or forced to do very physically demanding jobs, then they cannot be described as self-indulgent, callous, irresponsible, or light-minded if they seek abortions mainly with a view to avoiding pregnancy as the physical condition that it is. To go through with a pregnancy when one is utterly exhausted, or when one’s job consists of crawling along tunnels hauling coal, as many women in the nineteenth century were obliged to do, is perhaps heroic, but people who do not achieve heroism are not necessarily vicious. That they can view the pregnancy only as eight months of misery, followed by hours if not days of agony and exhaustion, and abortion only as the blessed escape from this prospect, is entirely understandable and does not manifest any lack of serious respect for human life or a shallow attitude to motherhood. What it does show is that something is terribly amiss in the conditions of their lives, which make it so hard to recognize pregnancy and childbearing as the good that they can be. The foregoing discussion, insofar as it emphasizes the right attitude to human life and death, parallels to a certain extent those standard discussions of abortion that concentrate on it solely as an issue of killing. But it does not, as those discussions do, gloss over the fact, emphasized by those who discuss the morality of abortion in terms of women’s rights, that abortion, wildly unlike any other form of killing, is the termination of a pregnancy, which is a condition of a woman’s body and results in her having a child if it is not aborted.
This fact is given due recognition not by appeal to women’s rights but by emphasizing the relevance of the familiar biological and psychological facts and their connection with having the right attitude to parenthood and family relationships. But it may well be thought that failing to bring in women’s rights still leaves some important aspects of the problem of abortion untouched.
Speaking in terms of women’s rights, people sometimes say things like,
“Well, it’s her life you re talking about too, you know;
she’s got a right to her own life, her own happiness.” And the discussion stops there. But in the context of virtue theory, given that we are particularly concerned with what constitutes a good human life, with what true happiness or eudaimonia is, this is no place to stop. We go on to ask,
And is this life of hers a good one? Is she
living well?”
If we are to go on to talk about good human lives, in the context of abortion, we have to bring in our thoughts about the value of love and family life, and our proper emotional development through a natural life cycle. The familiar facts support the view that parenthood in general, and motherhood and childbearing in particular, are intrinsically worthwhile, are among the things that can be correctly thought to be partially constitutive of a flourishing human life. If this is right, then a woman who opts for not being a mother (at all, or again, or now) by opting for abortion may thereby be manifesting a flawed grasp of what her life should be, and be about–a grasp that is childish, or grossly materialistic, or shortsighted, or shallow.
I said “may thereby’: this need not be so. Consider, for instance, a woman who has already had several children and fears that to have another will seriously affect her capacity to be a good mother to the ones she has-she does not show a lack of appreciation of the intrinsic value of being a parent by opting for abortion. Nor does a woman who has been a good mother and is approaching the age at which she may be looking forward to being a good grandmother.
Nor does a woman who discovers that her pregnancy may well kill her, and opts for abortion and adoption. Nor, necessarily, does a woman who has decided to lead a life centered around some other worthwhile activity or activities with which motherhood would compete.
People who are childless by choice are sometimes described as
“irresponsible,” or “selfish,” or “refusing to grow up,” or “not knowing what life is about.” But one can hold that having children is intrinsically worthwhile without endorsing this, for we are, after all, in the happy position of there being more worthwhile things to do than can be fitted into one lifetime. Parenthood, and motherhood in particular, even if granted to be intrinsically worthwhile, undoubtedly take up a lot of one’s adult life, leaving no room for some other worthwhile pursuits. But some women who choose abortion rather than have their first child, and some men who encourage their partners to choose abortion, are not avoiding parenthood for the sake of other worthwhile pursuits, but for the worthless one of “having a good time,” or for the pursuit of some others who say “I am not ready for parenthood yet” are making some sort of mistake about the extent to which one can manipulate the circumstances of one’s life so as to make it fulfill some dream that one has. Perhaps one’s dream is to have two perfect children, a girl and a boy, within a perfect marriage, in financially secure circumstances, with an interesting job of one’s own. But to care too much about that dream, to demand of life that it give it to one and act accordingly, may be both greedy and foolish, and is to run the risk of missing out on happiness entirely. Not only may fate make the dream impossible, or destroy it, but one’s own attachment to it may make it impossible. Good marriages, and the most promising children, can be destroyed by just one adult’s excessive demand for perfection.
Once again, this is not to deny that girls may quite properly say “I am not ready for motherhood yet,” especially in our society, and, far from manifesting irresponsibility or light-mindedness, show an appropriate modesty or humility, or a fearfulness that does not amount to cowardice. However, even when the decision to have an abortion is the right decision–one that does not itself fall under a vice-related term and thereby one that the perfectly virtuous could recommend-it does not follow that there is no sense in which having the abortion is wrong, or guilt inappropriate. For, by virtue of the fact that a human life has been cut short, some evil has probably been brought about, and that circumstances make the decision to bring about some evil the right decision will be a ground for guilt if getting into those circumstances in the first place itself manifested a flaw in character.
What “gets one into those circumstances” in the case of abortion is, except in the case of rape, one’s sexual activity and one’s choices, or the lack of them, about one’s sexual partner and about contraception. The virtuous woman (which here of course does not mean simply “chaste woman” but “woman with the virtues”) has such character traits as strength, independence, resoluteness, decisiveness, self-confidence, responsibility, serious-mindedness, and self-determination–and no one, I think, could deny that many women become pregnant in circumstances in which they cannot welcome or cannot face the thought of having this child precisely because they lack one or some of these character traits. So even in the cases where the decision to have an abortion is the right one, it can still be the reflection of a moral failing-not because the decision itself is weak or cowardly or irresolute or irresponsible or light-minded, but because lack of the requisite opposite of these failings landed one in the circumstances in the first place. Hence the common universalized claim that guilt and remorse are never appropriate emotions about an abortion is denied. They may be appropriate, and appropriately inculcated, even when the decision was the right one.
Another motivation for bringing women’s rights into the discussion may be to attempt to correct the implication, carried by the killing-centered approach, that insofar as abortion is wrong, it is a wrong that only women do, or at least (given the preponderance of male doctors) that only women instigate. I do not myself believe that we can thus escape the fact that nature bears harder on women than it does on men, but virtue theory can certainly correct many of the injustices that the emphasis on women’s rights is rightly concerned about. With very little amendment, everything that has been said above applies to boys and men too. Although the abortion decision is, in a natural sense, the woman’s decision, proper to her, boys and men are often party to it, for well or ill, and even when they are not, they are bound to have been party to the circumstances that brought it up. No less than girls and women, boys and men can, in their actions, manifest self-centeredness, callousness, and light-mindedness about life and parenthood in relation to abortion. They can be self-centered or courageous about the possibility of disability in their offspring; they need to reflect on their sexual activity and their choices, or the lack of them, about their sexual partner and contraception; they need to grow up and take responsibility for their own actions and life in relation to fatherhood. If it is true, as I maintain, that insofar as motherhood is intrinsically worthwhile, being a mother is an important purpose in women’s lives, being a father (rather than a mere generator) is an important purpose in men’s lives as well, and it is adolescent of men to turn a blind eye to this and pretend that they have many more important things to do.

Introduction: Abortion is a topic that has been predominantly discussed in terms of the status of the fetus and women’s rights. However, it is unclear how virtue theory can provide a unique perspective on the morality of abortion beyond the virtuous agent’s actions or appeals to what they know. This article by Rosalind Hursthouse argues that virtue theory disregards the dominant considerations of abortion and transforms the discussion.

Description: In this article, Rosalind Hursthouse discusses how the dominant considerations of abortion, the status of the fetus and women’s rights, are fundamentally irrelevant to virtue theory. Many assume that the discussion will only focus on what the virtuous agent would do or that justice and charity will be the only considerations applied to the issue. Hursthouse argues that these assumptions fail to recognize how virtue theory transforms the discussion of abortion.

Hursthouse first considers the issue of women’s rights and how they may have a moral right to terminate their pregnancies. However, even if women have such a moral right, it does not follow that the act of abortion is morally acceptable according to virtue theory. Virtue theory suggests that one can exercise a moral right but still act viciously, such as being cruel, callous, selfish, or disloyal.

Hursthouse then argues that virtue theory can provide insight into the morality of abortion by examining the virtuous agent’s entire character and how it relates to their decision to abort. Virtue theory emphasizes the importance of balancing virtues such as compassion, courage, and honesty to make morally correct decisions. According to Hursthouse, virtuous agents would consider the interests of all parties involved in an abortion, including the fetus, the mother, and the father.

Overall, this article challenges the commonly held views surrounding the morality of abortion and proposes a new perspective that considers the role of virtue in decision-making.

Virtue Theory and Abortion

Objectives:
1. To understand the limitations of the traditional framework used to discuss the morality of abortion
2. To learn about how virtue theory transforms the discussion of abortion
3. To learn the importance of taking virtues into account when discussing moral issues

Learning Outcomes:
1. Students will be able to identify the two traditional considerations when discussing the morality of abortion: the status of the fetus and women’s rights
2. Students will be able to explain how virtue theory dismisses these traditional considerations as fundamentally irrelevant
3. Students will be able to apply the concept of moral virtue to the discussion of abortion and other moral issues

Summary:

Rosalind Hursthouse argues that the traditional framework used to discuss the morality of abortion is limited in its focus on the status of the fetus and women’s rights. She suggests that virtue theory transforms the discussion of abortion by considering moral virtues such as kindness, loyalty, and honesty. Hursthouse emphasizes that exercising a moral right, such as the right to terminate a pregnancy, can still result in a vicious or morally wrong act. She reminds readers that virtues are important to consider in any moral discussion, including the morality of abortion. While Hursthouse does not address the justice or injustice of laws prohibiting or permitting abortion, she suggests that focusing solely on women’s rights is not sufficient for a comprehensive discussion of abortion morality.

In this selection, Rosalind Hursthouse discusses the contribution of virtue theory to the morality of abortion. She notes that the discussion of abortion is often limited to two considerations, namely the status of the fetus and women’s rights, and argues that this framework fails to appreciate virtue theory and how it transforms the discussion of abortion. She suggests that the virtue theorist’s discussion of abortion dismisses the two dominant considerations as fundamentally irrelevant and shows how this is the case.

Hursthouse explains that the claim that women have a moral right to do as they choose with their own bodies, or to terminate their pregnancies, does not necessarily mean that abortion is morally right. She argues that exercising a moral right can still lead to vicious actions, such as being callous or selfish. Thus, virtue theory provides a more nuanced perspective on the morality of abortion that takes into account not only the status of the fetus or women’s rights but also the virtues that are necessary for a virtuous agent to make morally sound decisions.

Solution 1: Virtue Ethics and Abortion

One possible solution to the issues presented in the text is to apply virtue ethics to the discussion of abortion. Virtue ethics focuses on what sort of person one should strive to be rather than on the rightness or wrongness of specific actions. According to virtue ethics, individuals ought to cultivate virtues such as compassion, honesty, and humility.

Applied to the morality of abortion, virtue ethics would suggest that individuals ought to consider not only women’s rights and the status of the fetus but also the virtues of compassion, empathy, and courage. For example, an agent who is compassionate and empathetic would be more likely to consider the well-being of the fetus as well as that of the mother. A virtuous agent would also be courageous in admitting the complexity of the issue and in being willing to engage with different perspectives.

Solution 2: Virtue Ethics and Women’s Rights

Another possible solution would be to further develop the connection between virtue ethics and women’s rights. Hursthouse argues that the discussion of abortion is often limited to women’s rights and the status of the fetus, which fails to appreciate the role of virtue ethics in moral decision-making. However, it is still important to recognize women’s rights and their autonomy over their own bodies.

Applied to the morality of abortion, virtue ethics could acknowledge women’s rights while also emphasizing the virtues necessary for virtuous decision-making, such as compassion, empathy, and honesty. A virtuous agent would recognize the importance of women’s rights and autonomy while remaining mindful of the moral complexities of the issue, thereby arriving at a more nuanced and morally sound decision. By integrating women’s rights and virtue ethics, the discussion of abortion can be reframed in a way that takes into account both individual autonomy and moral soundness.

central importance to their lives.

Summary:

In “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” Rosalind Hursthouse critiques the limitations of discussions about the morality of abortion, which are often dominated by concerns around the status of the fetus and women’s rights. By framing the argument in terms of virtue theory, Hursthouse argues that these considerations are not particularly relevant to assessing the morality of abortion. Instead, she suggests that the key question is whether someone seeking an abortion is acting virtuously or viciously. This is because simply having the legal or moral right to do something does not necessarily mean that doing so is morally right. Virtue theory emphasizes that moral decision-making should take into account broader considerations of character, rather than just rights or legal entitlements.

Suggested Resources/Books:
– “The Virtues of Abortion” by James C. Mohr
– “Abortion and Virtue Ethics” edited by M. Therese Lysaught and Michael R. Uhlmann
– “The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: Exploring Moral Choices in Childbearing” by Helen Watt

Similar Asked Questions:
1. How do virtue ethics impact discussions of abortion?
2. What role does character play in moral decision-making according to virtue theory?
3. Can someone act viciously even if they have the legal or moral right to do something?
4. How does virtue ethics challenge traditional arguments for and against abortion?
5. What are the limitations of focusing solely on rights-based approaches to moral decision-making?

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